For our second topic, we decided on Self- Other Distinction (SOD), which is said to be an important part of the construct of empathy (Cuff, Brown, Taylor, & Howat, 2016; de Vignemont & Singer, 2006; Decety & Lamm, 2006; Gerdes, Segal, & Lietz, 2010; Lamm, Bukowski, & Silani, 2016) and which we define as “the ability to distinguish between the representations of our own actions, perceptions, sensations and emotions, and those of others.” (Lamm et al., 2016, p. 2).
The construct of empathy is said to be divided into two major aspects, Cognitive Empathy (CE) and Affective Empathy (AE) (Cuff et al., 2016; Decety & Lamm, 2006; Lamm et al., 2016; Saito, Yokoyama, & Ohira, 2016). Cognitive Empathy is said to entail constructs such as the Theory of Mind (ToM), Perspective taking and Mentalizing, whereas Affective Empathy is said to entail emotional contagion, mimicry, empathic concern and personal distress (Cuff et al., 2016; Saito et al., 2016).
Self-other distinction is said to be cognitive as well as affective (Lamm et al., 2016; Saito et al., 2016; Singer, 2006; Singer & Lamm, 2009; Steinbeis, 2016).Therefore, to be able to empathize with someone else we must first be aware that our feelings are a result of seeing someone else’s emotions and distinguish them from our own emotions.
Furthermore, self-other distinction distinguishes empathy from other concepts such as sympathy and compassion (Cuff et al., 2016; Eisenberg, 2008; Hein & Singer, 2008; Singer & Lamm, 2009), emotional contagion (Cuff et al., 2016; de Vignemont & Singer, 2006; Decety & Lamm, 2006) and personal distress (Batson, C. D., Early, S., & Salvarini, 1997; Cuff et al., 2016; de Vignemont & Singer, 2006; Decety & Lamm, 2006; Eisenberg, 2008). It is being argued that personal distress arises due to the absence of self-other distinction, meaning that personal distress is caused by the absence of awareness that emotions of another person are being incorporated (Cuff et al., 2016; Decety & Lamm, 2006; Hein & Singer, 2008; Singer & Lamm, 2009).
SOD also plays an important role in neurodevelopmental disorders such as Autism Spectrum Disorder, where it seems to mainly be distorted in the cognitive, but not affective domain (Hoffmann, Koehne, Steinbeis, Dziobek, & Singer, 2016) and Schizophrenia (Brunelin et al., 2006; Jardri et al., 2011; van der Weiden, Prikken, & van Haren, 2015). Schizophrenic patients show the ability for self-other integration (SOI), but seem to lack the ability for self-other distinction and it seems that SOI and SOD are interdependent (van der Weiden et al., 2015). Further research suggesting decreased SOD in patients with Schizophrenia can be found (Farrer et al., 2004; Jardri et al., 2011; Schimansky, David, Rössler, & Haker, 2010; Seal, Aleman, & McGuire, 2004)
The model proposed by Van der Weiden et al. (2015) distinguishes two processes from which SOD can result: Motor prediction, which suggest we rely on our own actions and outcomes in order to predict those of people and Cognitive Expectations, which deals with one’s own and others’ behaviours, emotions and beliefs (van der Weiden et al., 2015).
