The decision to enter war is not one to be made lightly and, unfortunately, must be made often. The devastating effects of waging war and the impact it has on an economy and civilian lives should be weighed and measured before the final decision is cast. In many cases, circumstances do not afford leaders the opportunity to weigh these factors beforehand. While the tension in Vietnam had been ongoing for many years prior to the official declaration of war, the final choice to enter the conflict directly was not made until after too many American solider lives had been lost. The decision to commit to war in Southeast Asia was based on President Johnson’s fear of being seen as a coward, his presidency ruined, and complete disregard for the American way of life.
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, in his book, In Retrospect, outlines eleven key events or decisions that would lead to the eventual involvement of the United States in South Vietnam in war against North Vietnam. Beginning with his role in Kennedy Administration, roughly 16,000 military advisors were sent to South Vietnam in an effort help train them to defend themselves in 1961. A decision in which Kennedy was certain to be completed in 1965 and the military personnel stationed there would begin to come home. It was not homecoming that President Kennedy himself would see firsthand as he was later assassinated in November of 1963. Lyndon B. Johnson was sworn in as President following the Kennedy assassination, and it would be President Johnson who made the official decision to engage in war with North Vietnam and initially send 175,000 troops to defend the South.
Stanley Karnow, a journalist during the Vietnam War, inserts comments from Johnson in his book Vietnam: A History. Karnow takes a quote by Johnson from one of Johnson’s biographers: It is plain to see from this statement that Johnson’s focus was more on his reputation than that of his American citizens. According to Karnow, Johnson feared that letting South Vietnam fall to Communism would “shatter my presidency, kill my administration, and danger our democracy.”
On August 2, 1964, the U.S. destroyer Maddox was attacked by torpedoes and automatic weapon fire from North Vietnamese boats. While no injuries were reported and the destroyer itself suffered only a single bullet hit, President Johnson rejected any retaliatory actions against the North. Johnson did, however, order the Maddox, as well as it’s air support, to attack any force that attacked them. Two days later, the destroyer reported a second attack, one that is still debated today as actually happening. Admiral Sharp, the commander of the Maddox, claims to have intercepted radio messages of Communists boats in the area preparing to attack.
These messages gave Sharp the impression that attack was imminent and his ship, along with the destroyer, the Tuner Joy, began firing. Despite no one on either vessel seeing an actual North Vietnamese boat or hearing enemy gunfire, Secretary McNamara and the Joint Chiefs reasoned that an attack likely happened and as a result, Johnson ordered jets into North Vietnamese territory to bomb an oil depot and four patrol boat bases. An attack that, even though seemingly minimal in scale, was a turning point in U.S. involvement.
February 19, 1965, the decision to conduct regular strikes on North Vietnam was made. President Johnson was counseled by Secretary McNamara, former President Eisenhower, and several other members of the Vietnam Advisors to proceed with immediate air strikes and to announce this decision to the public. Johnson refused to issue a state to the American public on the matter and McNamara provides insight on Johnson’s reasoning. The first factor was the president’s obsession with securing approval from Congress for financing the agenda he held for his Great Society. He did not want anything to take away from that. While Johnson feared overall failure in Vietnam, the second factor was his fear of nuclear retaliation from China and the Soviet Union should they have had prior knowledge of his plan. So on March 2, 1965, Operation Rolling Thunder began with over a hundred aircraft striking an ammunition depot in the North.
In his own words, President Johnson admited his fear of losing his reputation and presidency superseded the needs of the American people he was sworn to protect. Evidence from the then Secretary of Defense and a journalist on the ground during Vietnam are presented to show what Johnson’s concerns really were; that of his own stature and the image the U.S. needed to portray to the rest of the world. The ideas that Johnson held for his citizens, his hopes to help the homeless and hungry and care for the sick and the lame, took a backseat when confronted with the possibility of being seen as a coward and his nation being seen as weak.
